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Best Practices: DNS

Scope is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

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Best Practices: DNS

Version: July 15, 2026 This file is designed as detailed workshop and operations reference.

1. Scope

Scope is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Scope:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
01 / 21

2. Name space

Name space is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Name space:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
02 / 21

3. Resolver path

Resolver path is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Resolver path:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
03 / 21

4. Authoritative data

Authoritative data is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Authoritative data:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
04 / 21

5. Zone files

Zone files is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Zone files:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
05 / 21

6. Delegation

Delegation is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Delegation:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
06 / 21

7. Caching

Caching is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Caching:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
07 / 21

8. Negative caching

Negative caching is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Negative caching:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
08 / 21

9. Record types

Record types is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Record types:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
09 / 21

10. Transport

Transport is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Transport:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
10 / 21

11. DNSSEC

DNSSEC is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for DNSSEC:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
11 / 21

12. Transfers

Transfers is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Transfers:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
12 / 21

13. Resolver policy

Resolver policy is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Resolver policy:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
13 / 21

14. Kubernetes DNS

Kubernetes DNS is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Kubernetes DNS:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
14 / 21

15. Monitoring

Monitoring is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Monitoring:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
15 / 21

16. Operations

Operations is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Operations:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
16 / 21

17. Security

Security is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Security:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
17 / 21

18. Troubleshooting

Troubleshooting is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Troubleshooting:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
18 / 21

19. Review

Review is treated as a reviewable DNS building block in this workshop. The relevant point is not just a query, but its position in the name space, zone, delegation, resolver path, cache, transport and security model.

Review question Expectation
Role Stub resolver, recursive resolver, forwarder, authoritative name server or registry/provider is named.
Data Name, RRtype, RRset, zone, SOA and TTL are traceable.
Response RCODE, authority section and additional section are not ignored.
Operations Rollback, TTL window and propagation are documented.
bash
dig example.test SOA +norecurse 2>/dev/null || true
dig @127.0.0.1 example.test A +dnssec 2>/dev/null || true
dig example.test NS +trace 2>/dev/null || true
python3 tools/zone_lint.py zones/db.example.test 2>/dev/null || true

Practical notes for Review:

  • DNS is distributed and cached; local changes are not automatically globally visible.
  • TTL and negative TTL determine how quickly corrections take effect.
  • CNAME must not collide with other data at the same owner name.
  • Delegations need consistent NS records and glue where required.
  • DNSSEC protects integrity and origin, but not confidentiality.
  • EDNS extends DNS messages and matters for DNSSEC response sizes.
  • Public, private and Kubernetes-internal DNS views must be evaluated separately.

Common failure modes:

Symptom Common cause Diagnosis
NXDOMAIN name does not exist or wrong zone check SOA and authority
NOERROR without data NODATA or wrong RRtype check RRset and type
SERVFAIL DNSSEC, upstream or resolver failure check +dnssec, logs and validation
REFUSED ACL, recursion or transfer not allowed check server role and ACL
stale answer cache or TTL check TTL, resolver cache and SOA

Review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected: stub, recursive resolver or authoritative server?
  • Which zone, name or RRset is affected?
  • Which response is expected: NOERROR, NXDOMAIN, NODATA, SERVFAIL or REFUSED?
  • Which TTL, SOA or delegation decision affects behavior?
  • Which evidence supports the finding?
  • Which change would be risky in production?

Submission format for Best Practices:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  risk-note.md
  cleanup.md
19 / 21

Official Sources and Boundary

  • RFC 1034, Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1034
  • RFC 1035, Domain Names - Implementation and Specification: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1035
  • RFC 8499, DNS Terminology: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499/
  • RFC 6891, Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS(0)): https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6891
  • RFC 4033, DNS Security Introduction and Requirements: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4033
  • RFC 9364, DNSSEC Best Current Practice: https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9364/
  • IANA Root Zone Database: https://www.iana.org/domains/root/db
  • ISC BIND 9 Documentation: https://bind9.readthedocs.io/
  • CoreDNS Documentation: https://coredns.io/manual/toc/

This workshop does not introduce DNS protocol rules. It maps official DNS concepts into labs, review questions, zone files, resolver models and operational workflows.


20 / 21

Practice Appendix: DNS Evidence for best-practices-dns-EN.md

This appendix connects the file with repeatable DNS evidence. A DNS statement is reliable only when role, zone, name, RRtype, RCODE, TTL, resolver path and operational impact are reviewed together.

A.1 Namespace and FQDN

DNS starts with a hierarchical namespace. Every analysis must clarify whether a name is relative, fully qualified, part of a zone or affected by a local stub resolver search path.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Namespace and FQDN.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.2 Stub Resolver

The client stub resolver usually knows only local resolvers and search lists. Errors in resolv.conf, systemd-resolved or search domains can look like server failures.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Stub Resolver.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.3 Recursive Resolver

A recursive resolver performs iteration, caching, DNSSEC validation and forwarding. It is not the same as the authoritative server for a zone.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Recursive Resolver.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.4 Authoritative Server

Authoritative servers answer from zones. They should not provide open recursion and need clear zone ownership, transfer rules and monitoring.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Authoritative Server.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.5 Zone and Apex

A zone starts at the apex and contains SOA, NS and authoritative RRsets. Every change needs serial policy, review and rollback.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Zone and Apex.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.6 SOA and Serial

SOA controls zone metadata, refresh, retry, expire and negative cache time. Serial values matter for secondary servers and audit.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to SOA and Serial.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.7 TTL and Cache

TTL controls how long answers are cached. Before migrations TTLs must be lowered early enough and stabilized after the change.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to TTL and Cache.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.8 Negative Caching

NXDOMAIN and NODATA are cached through SOA information. This explains why deleted or newly created names are not visible everywhere immediately.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Negative Caching.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.9 Delegation

Delegation connects parent and child zone. NS records, glue and child SOA must be consistent or subtle outages appear.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Delegation.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.10 Glue Records

Glue is needed when name server names live inside the delegated zone. Wrong or missing glue can prevent reachability of the child zone.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Glue Records.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.11 Record Types

A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, TXT, SRV, PTR, NS and SOA have different rules. A CNAME must not be combined with other data at the same owner name.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Record Types.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.12 Mail DNS

SPF, DKIM and DMARC are DNS-based mail policy data. Syntax, TTL and organizational ownership must be reviewed separately.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Mail DNS.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.13 Reverse DNS

PTR zones belong to address space, not the forward zone. Ownership and delegation often differ from the domain zone.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Reverse DNS.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.14 Transport

DNS uses UDP and TCP. EDNS extends UDP response sizes; fragmentation, TC bit and TCP fallback are common failure sources.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Transport.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.15 EDNS

EDNS(0) enables larger responses and DNSSEC transport, but can be broken by firewalls or middleboxes.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to EDNS.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.16 DNSSEC

DNSSEC protects origin and integrity, not confidentiality. DS, DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC/NSEC3 and validation status must be reviewed together.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to DNSSEC.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.17 TSIG

TSIG protects zone transfers and dynamic updates with shared keys. These keys do not belong in repositories and need rotation.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to TSIG.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.18 Zone Transfer

AXFR and IXFR are operational functions. Allow-transfer, notify, secondary servers and audit must be documented clearly.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Zone Transfer.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.19 Dynamic Update

DNS UPDATE should be allowed only with narrow policy and TSIG. Uncontrolled updates can destroy zone integrity and audit.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Dynamic Update.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.20 Split Horizon

Split horizon creates different answers per view. This is legitimate, but troubleshooting and security review must name the affected view.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Split Horizon.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.21 Resolver Privacy

DoT, DoH and QNAME minimization affect transport and privacy. They do not replace DNSSEC or correct zone data.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Resolver Privacy.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.22 RPZ and DNS Firewall

Response policy zones and DNS firewalls are security controls. They need clear policy, logging, exception process and abuse prevention.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to RPZ and DNS Firewall.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.23 Kubernetes DNS

CoreDNS in Kubernetes combines service discovery, cluster domains and forwarding. Failures can come from CoreDNS, kube-dns configuration, NetworkPolicy or upstream DNS.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Kubernetes DNS.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.24 Monitoring

DNS monitoring must cover RCODE distribution, latency, SERVFAIL rate, NXDOMAIN spikes, transfer status, DNSSEC validation and zone serials.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Monitoring.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.25 Incident Response

DNS incidents need fast classification: affected view, resolver path, RCODE, TTL, cache, delegation, DNSSEC and recent changes.

Review field Expectation
Context best-practices-dns-EN.md names the relation to Incident Response.
Evidence Query output, zone file, log, YAML/JSON/TOML or runbook exists.
Operations TTL, cache, delegation, propagation and rollback are evaluated.
Security DNSSEC, TSIG, ACL, privacy or abuse control is checked when needed.

Concrete review questions:

  • Which DNS role is affected?
  • Which zone and owner name are affected?
  • Which RRtype and RCODE were observed?
  • Which TTL or negative cache time applies?
  • Which delegation or resolver path is involved?
  • Which security control is relevant?
  • Which evidence contains no secrets?
  • What is the rollback?

Typical evidence:

text
evidence/
  query-output.txt
  zone-review.txt
  resolver-path.md
  ttl-and-cache.md
  rollback.md

A.26 Minimal Completion Evidence

  • RCODE, RRtype, zone and resolver path are documented.
  • Zone files contain SOA and NS and do not violate CNAME rules.
  • TTL, negative cache time and rollback window are named.
  • DNSSEC, TSIG or ACLs are not claimed without evidence.
  • Evidence contains no production secrets, API tokens or zone keys.
  • Official RFCs and tool documentation replace assumptions.
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DNS · Orthevs Academy

31 modules as one continuous learning path.

The sequence remains unchanged: from the lab skeleton through technical foundations and operating models to final troubleshooting. The technical directory names are deliberately preserved.

Orthevs – Engineering the foundation for what comes next.

Orthevs as an app

Install Orthevs

The Orthevs web app can be installed on supported mobile devices and desktop browsers.

iPhone and iPad

Open Orthevs in Safari. Tap Share, then Add to Home Screen. Enable Open as Web App if offered, then tap Add.

Android

For the web app, open the browser menu and choose Install app or Add to Home screen. Confirm the installation.

Desktop browser

Open the browser menu or the install icon in the address bar, then choose Install app or Add to Dock.

Web app installation depends on your browser. If no install prompt appears, follow the browser steps shown above.