Threat models, trust boundaries, and attack paths.
Security Engineering Lab · Security Strategy & Architecture
Threat Modeling Factory
Threat models, trust boundaries, and attack paths.
TMFSEL Factory
SEL · Factory Portfolio
A capability in the engineering lifecycle.
This Factory is a specialist tool of its Lab and provides a bounded technical capability. An Engineering Contract defines the need; Foundations and Baselines determine the model. Execution and outcomes remain versioned and verifiable.
Individual Factory profile
Threat Modeling Factory as a capability in the Security Engineering Lab.
The Threat Modeling Factory (TMF) groups the documented responsibility area “Threat models, trust boundaries, and attack paths” within the Security Engineering Lab. It belongs to the “Security Strategy & Architecture” domain and is described as an independently versioned Factory capability within that scope.
This profile describes the documented target model of this specific Factory. It claims neither a production implementation nor functions that are absent from the Factory record.
- Threat models
- trust boundaries
- attack paths
- Domain
- Security Strategy & Architecture
- Engineering Lab
- Security Engineering Lab
- Roadmap position
- Portfolio roadmap · planned capability
- Documented status
- Concept in the Orthevs Factory catalog
Mission and responsibility
What the Threat Modeling Factory is intended to cover.
The following responsibility areas are derived from the versioned profile of the Threat Modeling Factory. They make the subject “Threat models, trust boundaries, and attack paths” concrete for this Factory and separate it from general platform work.
- Responsibility area · 01
Documented focus: Threat models.
- Responsibility area · 02
Documented focus: trust boundaries.
- Responsibility area · 03
Documented focus: attack paths.
- Responsibility area · 04
Describe inputs, outputs, permissions and resources as a versioned capability.
- Responsibility area · 05
Keep relevant artifacts, provenance and status information traceable.
- Responsibility area · 06
Prepare handovers to adjacent Factories and cross-Lab capabilities through explicit contracts.
Factory-specific flow
How the Threat Modeling Factory fits the Orthevs model.
The flow connects the mission of the Threat Modeling Factory with the transitions defined by the Factory Contract. It is a target model for developing the capability, not evidence of an existing implementation.
- 01
Define the mission of the Threat Modeling Factory
The documented subject “Threat models, trust boundaries, and attack paths” establishes the domain starting point and boundary of the TMF capability.
- 02
Describe inputs and outputs for TMF
The manifest, schemas and versioned contracts are intended to state which inputs the Threat Modeling Factory processes and which outcomes or evidence it hands over.
- 03
Execute under the control of the Security Engineering Lab
The Factory Manager, permissions, resource declarations and lifecycle states place execution under the responsible Lab Core.
- 04
Make Threat Modeling Factory outcomes traceable
Status, artifacts and provenance are intended to keep the flows and handovers relevant to “Threat models, trust boundaries, and attack paths” verifiable.
- 05
Verify contracts and boundaries
The TMF capability remains within its documented ownership and uses adjacent Factories or platform services only through declared contracts.
- 06
Evolve through explicit versions
Changes to the mission, interfaces, artifacts or dependencies of the Threat Modeling Factory are intended to be maintained as traceable Factory versions.
Architecture role
How the Threat Modeling Factory is anchored in Orthevs.
The architecture separates the domain responsibility of the Threat Modeling Factory from shared Lab and platform services. This keeps the capability installable, versioned and integrable through contracts.
Domain context
The Threat Modeling Factory belongs to the “Security Strategy & Architecture” domain in the Security Engineering Lab. Its scope is set by the Factory record and the focus areas named there.
Capability and lifecycle
The Threat Modeling Factory describes a specialist capability of the SEL. Its Contract is intended to define inputs, outputs, permissions, versions and evidence. Depending on the need, it may be implemented as a plugin, package, service or adapter and qualified for a specific engineering process.
Interfaces and contracts
The TMF capability is intended to declare identity, lifecycle, capability interfaces, artifacts, execution constraints and dependencies through versioned Factory Contracts.
Artifacts and evidence
The manifest, contracts, schemas, implementation and checks form the technical shape planned for the Threat Modeling Factory; concrete details become binding only with its Factory version.
Deliverables
What is planned to be versioned for the Threat Modeling Factory.
The artifact structure makes the mission of the Threat Modeling Factory tangible as a verifiable Factory capability. It describes the expected form of the work, not files or releases that already exist.
- 01
factory.manifest.yaml for identity, version, runtime, permissions and dependencies.
- 02
Versioned API, event and capability contracts.
- 03
Typed schemas for inputs, outputs, evidence and provenance.
- 04
Implementation, adapters and runtime integration.
- 05
Contract, lifecycle, security and integration tests.
Integration
Binding Factory Contract
The Factory Contract makes the capability installable, composable and controllable. It covers not only the interface, but also identity, lifecycle, execution constraints, security, observability, dependencies and compatibility.
- Identity and manifest with Factory ID, version, maintainer and trust origin.
- Lifecycle with installation, initialization, start, stop, upgrade and health states.
- Versioned capability interfaces including errors, timeouts and compatibility.
- Artifact contracts for schemas, versions, checksums and provenance.
- Execution constraints for runtime, compute, storage, scaling and timeouts.
- Security rules for permissions, secrets, isolation and audit events.
- Observability through logs, metrics, traces, health and correlation IDs.
The listed contract areas represent the minimum scope intended by the architecture concept. Concrete protocols, schemas and versioning rules are defined for each Factory implementation.
Quality, security and boundaries
Controlled responsibility for TMF.
The Threat Modeling Factory has more than a domain mission. The Factory Contract also requires traceable permissions, execution boundaries, observability and documented handovers.
Boundary
The Factory stays within its declared domain boundary and uses platform-wide identity, secrets, policy, audit, events and artifact storage only through documented Orthevs contracts.
Security requirement
Security rules for permissions, secrets, isolation and audit events.
Observability and evidence
Observability through logs, metrics, traces, health and correlation IDs.
Maturity and roadmap
Planning state of the Threat Modeling Factory.
The Threat Modeling Factory is documented with the status “Concept in the Orthevs Factory catalog” and roadmap position “Portfolio roadmap · planned capability”. This locates its target model in the portfolio; it does not establish a production scope or delivery date.
Traceable source basis
Derived directly from the Factory concept.
The mission, responsibility areas, boundaries, artifacts, contracts and roadmap on this page come from the versioned profile of the Threat Modeling Factory (TMF) and the architecture concept of the Security Engineering Lab.
Orthevs Factory Portfolio
Think about capabilities in context.
Factories connect through shared contracts to form traceable engineering flows — from domain design to operation.